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BAIL BEFORE TRIAL:
REFLECTIONS OF A SCOTTISH LAWYER
T. B. SmiT t
Links between Scots law and the Law School of the University of
Pennsylvania are of long standing. Indeed, as Professor Nadelmann
has noted recently,1 James Wilson, a Scottish-born member of the Supreme Court of the United States, referred to Scottish sources frequently, when delivering his Lectures on Law in the University of
Pennsylvania in 1790. Shortly before the late Dr. Edwin R. Keedy
assumed his duties as professor at that University-where for fortyfour years he was to do pioneer work in the field of comparative criminal law and procedure-he had applied himself to a serious study of
Scottish criminal procedure. The fruits of this early research were
published in 1913,2 and his reputation has always stood high among
Scottish lawyers. Witness, for example, the reference to Keedy's researches in the Stair Society's publications.'
It is proposed to examine in this paper--dedicated to the memory
of Dr. Keedy -the operation of bail in Scottish practice, and to contrast it with the English system in particular. To understand Scottish
practice regarding bail, some knowledge of Scottish criminal law and
procedure in general is desirable. This can scarcely be assumed in a
learned journal which will be read by those who, for the most part,
have been trained in the Anglo-American common law. Fortunately,
Dr. Keedy himself has in his earlier writings explained Scottish criminal procedure to the American reader.4 What he wrote in 1913 is
still substantially true, though there have been important changes during the past forty-six years, and recent historical research has discounted
certain views related to and narrated by Dr. Keedy regarding the
earlier period of Scots law. So far as the modern law alone is concerned, his account written before the First World War has been superseded particularly in relation to appeal, outlawry and declarations at
judicial examination. Appeal is now competent from conviction on

t Queen's Counsel; Fellow of the British Academy; Professor of Civil Law,
University of Edinburgh. M.A., D.C.L., LL.D. The author is deeply grateful for the
criticism and helpful advice offered by the President of Queens College, Cambridge,
by Sheriff A. M. Prain and others.
1 Nadelmann, Joseph Story and George Joseph Bell, 1959 Juan,. REv. 31.
2 Keedy, Criminal Procedure in Scotland (pts. 1-2), 3 J.C M. L. & C. 728, 834
(1913).
3 1 SELECTED JUSCIARY CASES 1624-1650 242 (Stair Society Pub. 16, 1953).
4 See note 2 supra.
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indictment in the High Court of Justiciary,5 "outlawry" is abolished,'
and declaration by an accused at what is still rather misleadingly called
"judicial examination" is virtually obsolete.'
The reader may refer generally to Dr. Keedy's celebrated article
and to the standard works on Scottish criminal law and procedure.'
A few brief observations on the foundations and principles of Scottish
criminal procedure must suffice for present purposes. When the
separate kindgdoms of Scotland and England agreed to merge (from the
viewpoint of international law) in the new State of Great Britain on
May 1, 1707, the terms of union were set out in certain documents
which had effect as an international treaty, as legislation within the
several jurisdictions of Scotland and England and also as a constituent agreement. Though skeletal in form, there is a written constitution for Great Britain, limiting in certain respects the powers of
the new Parliament of Great Britain which replaced the former Parliaments of Scotland and England.9 In particular, safeguards were provided for Scots law and for the Scottish judicial system, which, without such protection, would have been liable to undue pressure from
English law to assimilate with it. Scotland, in the 18th century, shared
with the rest of civilized Europe the heritage of Roman law; English
law was an original and semi-insular system. In 1707 it can scarcely
be doubted that the civil law of Scotland, as restated by Stair in 1681
under the influence of the natural law school, was greatly superior in
quality to the English common law of the same period, which was then
passing through an arid and formalistic epoch. Scottish criminal law
and procedure at the same period had not reached the same state of
maturity. Paradoxically, Scottish criminal law has benefited by its
relatively late development, and has achieved a flexibility which English
criminal law-at one time more mature-lost through early crystallization by precedent. Moreover, since the High Court of Justiciary in
Edinburgh is the ultimate tribunal in all Scottish criminal causes, there
has been no opportunity given to the House of Lords (as judicial
organ of the United Kingdom Parliament) to impose English solutions
Criminal Appeal (Scotland) Act, 1926, 16 & 17 Geo. 5, c. 15.
6 Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, c. 94, § 15(2).
5

7 RENTON &ABROWN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ACCORDING TO THE LAW OF SCOTLAND
See also SMITH, United Kingdom: Scotland 764-66, in THE
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH-THE DEVELOPMENT OF ITS LAWS AND CONSTITUTIONS

31 (3d ed. 1959).

(1955) ; Smith, Public Interest and the Interests of the Accused in the Criminal

Process--Reflections of a Scottish Lawyer, 32 TuL. L. REv. 349, 362-63 (1958).
S MACDONALD, CRIMINAL LAW OF SCOTLAND (5th ed. 1948) ; RENTON & BROWN,
op. cit. supra note 7; Lord Normand, The Public Prosecutor in Scotland, 54 L.Q.
REV. 345 (1938); Scottish Judicature and Legal Procedure (Holdsworth Club of
Univ. of Birmingham 1941). See also SMITH, op. cit. supra note 7, at c. 28.
9 This is more fully developed by the writer in The Union of 1707 as Fundamental Law, 1957 PUB. L. 99.
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on Scots law. Such influence as English criminal law has had on
Scots law has been through true comparative methods.
Scottish substantive criminal law--except for the relatively small
contribution of statute-derives from the practice of the courts, influenced to some extent by the civil and canon law and mediated
through the institutional writers and Justiciary reports. Scottish criminal procedure, though worked out in the practice of the Justiciary
Court, is largely based on statute-in particular, the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887,1" so far as indictable crimes are concerned, while the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Act, 1954,11 regulates summary procedure. The pivot of the administration of criminal
justice in Scotland is the office of Lord Advocate-which is invested
with extensive powers and discretion. Though private prosecution may
be competent in rare cases, no private prosecution for serious crime has
taken place since 1909.12 Here Scottish practice differs greatly from
that of England, where prosecutions are not normally undertaken by
an official public prosecutor. In England the basic principle underlying
prosecution is that it is open to any member of the public to institute
proceedings, and he need not have any interest whatever in the subject
matter of the charge. When a person in public employment, such as
a police officer, prosecutes, he does so as "a member of the public"-but
such prosecutions, though not undertaken by a public prosecutor, are
usually contrasted with "private prosecutions" instituted by private
citizens."3 Criminal prosecution in Scotland is the concern of the Lord
Advocate, assisted by the Solicitor-General for Scotland, six Advocates-Depute and by the permanent officials of the Crown Office. In
the sheriffdoms "4 the Lord Advocate has also his representatives, Pro1050 & 51 Vict., c. 35.
112 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 48.
12 J. & P. Coats, Ltd. v. Brown, (1909) 6 Adam 19, [1909] Sess. Cases 29
(Justiciary).
13 JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 108 (2d ed. 1953).
14
Scotland is divided for judicial and for some administrative purposes into
Sheriffdoms. Formerly each county was a separate Sheriffdom, but amalgamations
of the less populous counties have reduced the number of Sheriffdoms to twelve.
To each of these a Sheriff-Principal is appointed, but in the principal towns of each
Sheriffdom there are resident Sheriffs who handle the great bulk of judicial business.
The Sheriff Court is an initial trial court which in most civil matters has concurrent
jurisdiction (without monetary limitation) with the Outer House of the Court of
Session. Though his powers of punishment are normally limited to two years' imprisonment, the Sheriff may try all crimes and offences committed within the Sheriffdom, except for a small number which are excluded-such as treason, murder, attempt
to murder, rape, incest, and offences under the Official Secrets Acts. Appeals lie
from the Sheriff Court exercising criminal jurisdiction to a quorum of Judges of the
High Court of Justiciary, Scotland's superior criminal court. This court comprises
fifteen judges who are also (in the capacity of Senators of the College of Justice) the
judges of the Court of Session, Scotland's superior civil court. In civil, though not
in criminal matters, an appeal may be carried to the House of Lords where judicial
functions are exercised by a Judicial Committee comprising eminent Scottish, English
and Irish judges.
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curators-Fiscal, to whom he issues instructions and delegates certain
powers of investigating and prosecuting crime. The Lord Advocate
has wide discretion as to when to prosecute-or abandon prosecution.
He is ultimately answerable for his decisions in Parliament, but cannot be compelled to act contrary to his judgment. Provision is made
in Scottish practice for both prosecution and defense to have notice
within limits of the case to be put forward at trial by the other side,
but this is not achieved by calling evidence in a preliminary judicial
enquiry. Pre-trial procedure in Scotland is quasi-inquisitorial, in the
sense that there is no "hearing" as in England or the United States
to ascertain whether a suspect should be committed for trial. The
Crown Office and Procurators-Fiscal in Scotland will prepare the case
-precognoscing witnesses and preparing a dossier for trial; and, if
eventually they are not satisfied that the evidence against a suspect
would justify conviction, they may drop proceedings and cause the
suspect to be released, if he is in custody awaiting trial.
A study of the theory and practice of bail in the United States,
Scotland and England discloses certain fundamental similarities and
also a number of important differences. Important surveys of the administration of bail in New York and Philadelphia have been undertaken recently by students of the University of Pennsylvania Law
School. 5 Each stresses that the right to bail before trial in non-capital
cases is guaranteed by constitutional law. The Supreme Court of the
United States has observed, "Unless this right to bail before trial is
preserved, the presumption of innocence, secured only after centuries
of struggle would lose its meaning." 16 The learned author of the
"Comment on the New York Bail Study" contends, moreover, that in
United States practice the sole consideration in granting bail is to
ensure that the defendant will appear for trial; other factors taken into
account by British and continental systems, such as likelihood of tampering with evidence or of committing criminal acts after bail and pending
trial, are not in theory relevant in American practice. "'[T]he spirit
of the procedure is to enable [defendants] to stay out of jail until a
trial has found them guilty.' Beside the fact that such a policy is
implicit in the presumption of innocence, the soundness of our theory
will be apparent to anyone who contemplates the, almost insuperable
difficulty of trying to contact witnesses and prepare and finance a defense from the enforced idleness of a prison cell." 17
15 Note, A Study of the Administration of Bail in New York City, 106 U. PA.

L. REv. 693 (1958); Note, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail
in Philadelphia, 102 U. PA. L. Rxv. 1031 (1954).
16Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1, 4 (1951).
17Foote, Forward: Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. REv.

685, 686 (1958).
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Other legal systems, such as those of Scotland and England are
liberal in their practice of awarding bail, but they do not restrict themselves to consideration merely of what security (usually financial) will
ensure the appearance of an accused at his trial. The public interest
is weighed as well as that of the individual suspect, and-in the present
writer's view-properly so. The "presumption of innocence," in Britain at all events, is a rule of evidence to secure fair trial, and implies
that the guilt of an accused must be proved at his trial beyond all
reasonable doubt. It does not mean that those who discharge executive
or administrative functions prior to trial should be bound to act as
though the suspect had behaved, and would pending trial behave, as a
law-abiding citizen. This would be to contradict the experience of
mankind over the ages. To take extreme examples-the householder
who apprehends the housebreaker rifling his desk, and the police officer
who arrests the armed robber, weapon in hand, by the corpse of his
victim, have no doubt about the guilt of the accused; the public prosecutor or judge who has to determine whether bail should be granted
in such cases (and has considered the evidence of eye witnesses) may
well have little doubt that the accused has committed the acts alleged
against him. It is not, however, for them to determine the question
of guilt or innocence. This is the province of the trial court. Pressed
to extremes, the presumption of innocence would preclude arrest and
pre-trial custody altogether, and, incidentally, entirely frustrate extradition proceedings. Moreover, it has been established by experience
again and again that those who are known to have committed particular crimes in the past-such as theft by housebreaking-and are
accused of yet another such crime, are all too prone to avail themselves
of a period of release on bail to ensure that they do not hang for a
lamb. Further, tampering with evidence and intimidation of witnesses
does happen, and the duty to ensure fair trial and vindication of justice
is not concerned with the interests of the accused alone. The considerations which would justify the granting or refusing of bail in the 20th
century are not necessarily identical with those of the 18th century
when executive and judicial arrangements were less efficient, and when
prison conditions in general were appalling. The 21st century in its
turn may well bring forth new factors to be weighed.
Since English criminal law and procedure provided the foundation
for the various systems operating in the United States, it may be convenient before proceeding to a fuller discussion of the Scottish system,
to make brief mention of present practice regarding the granting of
bail in England. No historical introduction is necessary for an American lawyer to understand it. Bail in treason is discretionary and may
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only be granted by a Secretary of State or by a judge of the High
Court."8 Examining justices have power to grant bail to all persons
committed for trial for any felony or misdemeanour, but there is no
absolute obligation to grant bail.' 9 A person who is refused bail by
the justices may apply to a judge of the High Court who may grant
it; and if (except in cases of treason or murder) the examining magistrates commit a person for trial without releasing him on bail, they
must inform him of his right to apply for bail to a judge of the High
Court.20 A judge of the High Court has, however, no inherent jurisdiction to reduce the amount of bail where the justices in the exercise
of their statutory powers have fixed bail in a specified sum; but, if that
sum is so excessive that the prisoner cannot avail himself of it, application may be made to a Divisional Court for a writ of habeas corpus, on
the ground that the imposition of such excessive bail amounts to an
unlawful refusal of bail, and, contravening the Bill of Rights, 1689,21
makes the imprisonment of the applicant unlawful.22 The effect of
habeas corpus procedure and of the Assizes Relief Act, 1889,23 English
lawyers have claimed hitherto, is that a person cannot be kept long in
confinement against his will, but can secure either speedy trial or release on bail. However, the case of R. v. Campbell24 last year indicates that the Habeas Corpus Act 28 affords a much less effective
guarantee of speedy trial than had been thought.26 Laski, J., considered
that it may be "difficult, if not impossible, to comply with the requirements of the statute." 27 Certainly if the courts were to insist on strict
18 Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 8.
19 Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. A c. 55, § 7(2).
20Magistrates' Court Rules, 1952, rule 9, [1952] 2 STAT. INSTR. 1598 (No. 2190).
21 1 W. & M., c. 2.
2 Ex ParteThomas, 1956 Ciai. L. REv. (Eng.) 119 (Q.B. 1955); R. v. Campbell,
[1959] 1 Weekly L.R. 646 (Liverpool Crown Ct.).

52 & 53 Vict., c. 12, § 3.
[1959] 1 Weekly' L.R. 646 (Liverpool Crown Ct).
25
Habeas Corpus Act, 1679, 31 Car. 2, c. 2, § 6.
26
Campbell and two other persons were committed for trial in December 1958
23
24

on a charge of robbery.

In January 1959, the two others pleaded guilty, and were

sentenced, but Campbell pleaded not guilty. On this occasion, and again in February 1959, the prosecution applied for the trial to be postponed because an essential

prosecution witness (a seaman) was out of the country. In March 1959, when it
became known that this witness could not return until July, the prosecution asked

for a direction whether an application for respite should be made in each session
until July or whether the court could there and then order that the trial be respited
until July. The issue of bail arose indirectly out of this application by the prosecution. The Recorder held that the Habeas Corpus Act did not apply, because the
application had been made by the prosecution, and not, as required in the act, by
the defence; and moreover, because Campbell had not complied with the somewhat

complicated procedural conditions precedent laid down in that act. It was no longer
possible for him so to apply, but the judge exercised a discretionary power (not dependent on the Habeas Corpus Act) to order that the case should lie on the file, and
that no further proceedings be taken without leave of the court Campbell was then
released from custody.
271 Weekly L.R. at 650.
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compliance with the procedural requirements of the act, this would
deny a remedy to any prisoner who had expected to be, but had not in
fact been, brought to trial during the first session after committal. The
Attorney-General has indicated that legislation will be hastened on to
remedy this situation, and, as this will be a question of English law
reform, presumably Parliament will find time for it.
This much is trite law. In fact, of course, the vast majority of all
prosecutions in England-perhaps 99 per cent-are dealt with by
magistrates within a few days, and in nearly all such cases the accused
is allowed to be at liberty until his trial. If he is accused of certain
offenses triable by the justices, has been arrested without warrant, and
has not been brought before a magistrate within twenty-four hours,
his right to liberation on bail is absolute.2" So far as serious offenses
are concerned, arrest is usually upon warrant, and in such cases there
may well be delay. When the suspect is first brought before the magistrates, the prosecution may wish more time to prepare their case and
ask for him to be remanded. Though this may not be for more than
eights days at a time,29 there may be several periods of remand, and at
this stage the granting of bail is in the magistrates' discretion. If eventually the prosecution establish a prima facie case before the examining
justices, and the accused is committed for trial, again the magistrates
must exercise their discretion as to whether bail should be granted or
refused. If bail is refused at any time before committal, or after committal but before trial, the accused may appeal to a judge of the High
Court-which involves the serving of a summons both on the prosecution and on the magistrate refusing bail.
The leading treatise on English criminal practice 0 states: "The
requirements as to bail are merely to secure the attendance of the defendant at the trial . . . . The proper test of whether bail should be
granted or refused is whether the accused person will appear to take
his trial." "' This test, it is said, should be applied by reference to the
nature of the accusation, the nature of the evidence in support of the
accusation, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, and whether the sureties are independent or indemnified by the
accused. If this were all, English practice would not diverge far from
that of the United States, but in recent years a gloss has been addedwhich seems to qualify the generality of the major proposition and
which is treated as an exception, rather than as a reason for broadening
28
29
3

Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, §38(1).
Magistrates' Courts Act, 1952, 15 & 16 Geo. 6 & 1 Eliz. 2, c. 55, § 105(4).

0 ARCHBOLD, CRIMINAL PLEADING, EVIDENCE AND PRACTICE (31st
KENNY, OUTLINES OF CRIMINAL LAW 449

3 Id. at 68. See also

1 STONE'S JUSTICES MANUAL 1, 45 (91st ed. 1959).

ed. 1943).
(4th ed. 1909);
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the principles upon which bail is granted. In a number of authoritative
decisions it has been stressed by the Court of Criminal Appeal that before granting bail the magistrates should consider the known criminal
record of the accused, and the probability that, if released on bail, he will
commit crimes similar to those of which he has been convicted in the
past and for which he has been committed for trial.
Thus Lord Goddard, L.C.J., observed in R. v. Gentry: 32 "[A]s
this Court has pointed out over and over again, it is most dangerous
to grant bail to a man with a long record of convictions, unless the
magistrates think that there is a real doubt as to his guilt, because he
is sure, if he is committed to bail, to commit offences while he is on
bail." This statement must, of course, be read with the judgment of
the Court of Criminal Appeal in R. v. Phillips:33 "Some crimes are
not at all likely to be repeated pending trial and in those cases there
may be no objection to bail; but some . . . and housebreaking parIn R. v.
ticularly . . . will very probably be repeated. . . . "

Phillips the judges criticised strongly magistrates who had granted bail
to an accused who in effect had no answer to three charges against him,
and who at his trial asked that nine further offences committed while
on bail be taken into consideration 35 in awarding sentence.3 6 And in
R. v. Wharton 37 the Court of Criminal Appeal reiterated that persons
with bad criminal records should as a rule not be granted bail pending
38
trial.
In short, though the main test in England as to whether bail
should be granted is whether an accused will appear to stand his trial,
the public interest is also considered in the somewhat limited context
of assessing the risk of the accused committing offences while on bail.
The learned author of "Comment on the New York Bail Study" 39
observes: "It is significant that countries which use this reason for
denying bail usually phrase it in terms of the fear that the defendant
will commit 'another' crime while on bail, which, of course, assumes
3239

3332

Crim. App. R. 195, 196 (Crim. App. 1955).

Crim. App. R. 47 (Crim. App. 1947).

84Id. at 48.

1951) (dictum).

See also R. v. Armstrong, 35 Crim. App. R. 72, 74 (Crim. App.

35 A person who has pleaded guilty, or after conviction, may, in the U.K., ask

that other crimes which he is prepared to admit should also be taken into account

when sentence is imposed. If the court is willing to accede to this request, the prisoner

on release after serving his sentence, is free to make a fresh start without fear of
arrest and punishment for the crimes taken into consideration when he was sentenced.
3632 Crim. App. R. at 47-48.
[1955] CRim. L. REv. (Eng.) 565 (Crim. App.).
38 The opinion was circulated to clerks and justices. Home Office Circular No.
132/1955.
39 Foote, Forward: Comment on the New York Bail Study, 106 U. PA. L. Rtv.
37

685 (1958).
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that he is guilty of the first offense for which he is still to be tried." 40
The present writer would agree that any such phrasing is unfortunate,
but is not unduly worried about the refusal of bail to a person of known
criminal record accused on prima facie convincing evidence of another
crime of the same species. Those who grant bail are not his judges
in the instant case; and, in exercising their discretion in such a case,
they may reasonably have regard to the public interest. It will, of
course, involve hardship if on this particular occasion suspicion has
focussed on the wrong man; indeed it is particularly sad when (as does
sometimes happen) a man with a record, trying to go straight, is mistakenly accused; and it is undeniably the case that the imprisonment
of a suspect handicaps the preparation of his defence. In England, however, the discretion to refuse bail is usually exercised after the magistrates have been satisfied that the prosecution has established a prima
facie case.
So far as the present writer can judge there is little evidence that
refusal of bail is used in England as a precautionary punishment of
those who might be acquitted, nor, except in rare cases, is a suspect
with substantial means favoured by contrast with the impecunious.
The institution of professional bail providers does not flourish, and
solicitors are discouraged by the Law Society of England from providing bail for clients.4 1
Criticisms have, certainly, been made of the English bail system
in practice.42 A suspect in the initial stage of prosecution may well not
be legally represented, 43 and, in this event, magistrates not infrequently,
perhaps, refuse bail if the police oppose it-even without stating reasons. This may give opportunity for the police to exercise pressure
upon the uncooperative suspect, but there is little evidence that advantage is taken of it. Dr. Glanville Williams has suggested several
reforms so far as English practice is concerned. He considers inter
alia that there should be a speedier method of getting bail-by simple
application which would impose on the court the duty to obtain copies
of the depositions whereon they could decide the matter; that legal assistance should be provided whenever bail is in issue; that the police
should always give their reasons in writing both to the accused and to
the magistrates when they oppose bail; that the magistrates should be
required to state their reasons for refusing bail and note the evidence
on which these reasons are founded; and that procedure on appeal to
40 Id. at 685 n.4. The author cites as an example the Yugoslavia Code of Criminal
1954, art. 182.
Procedure,
41
Law Society Gazette, Aug. 1952, p. 102.
42
See generally G. Wn.UAMs, THE REFORm OF THE LAW 186-90 (1951).
43Id. at 188.
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the High Court should be simplified and expedited.44 These reforms
could be beneficial in the very small number of cases in which the
present system works hardship. Except, perhaps, in rare cases, where
the police oppose bail, these reforms are designed to improve procedure
rather than to correct abuses. An observer from Scotland-where
there is no pre-trial hearing-may express mild surprise that, even
after the justices have heard the evidence for the prosecution, they
should rely as much as Dr. Glanville Williams suggests they do on
police opinion regarding the merits of an application for bail. The
matter might be different if, as Lord Goddard has suggested recently,
the pre-trial hearing in England were to be abolished.
The distinctions between Scottish and English practice regarding
the granting of bail are substantial, and in large measure due to differences in procedure. In particular, first, as has been noted, unlike
the situation in England, prosecution in Scotland is almost always the
concern of public prosecutors-the Crown Office and its representatives
in the Sheriffdoms. Secondly, though in Scotland a suspect is brought
before a judge (the Sheriff) " at an early stage in proceedings, this is
to secure judicial supervision of procedure 46 and not to investigate the
weight of the case against the accused.47 It follows, therefore, that
in Scottish pre-trial procedure the prosecuting authorities, not the
courts, have most of the information relevant to the granting or with44
1d.
45
In

at 188-89.
Scots law the Sheriff or professional judge has virtually unlimited civil
jurisdiction, and has criminal jurisdiction over most crimes. He can grant bail to a
person accused of a crime which he may not try. The office of Sheriff in Scotland
therefore clearly does not correspond to that of the English or American sheriff.
See generally Sheriff S. G. Kermack's admirable survey The Law Courts of Scotland,
45 A.B.A.J.
451 (1959) ; SMITH, op. cit. supra note 7, at 679, 683.
46
For general explanation of judicial supervision of pre-trial procedure see
authorities cited note 7 supra.
47 Before the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vict., c. 35, came
into force there is clear authority that the Sheriff, before committing an accused for
trial, was expected to give "full and deliberate consideration of the declarations of the
prisoners and the precognitions of the witnesses examined for the prosecution." See,
e.g., Directors of City of Glasgow Bank v. H. M. Advocate, (1878) GR. (J.) 4, 7-8,
[1878-1879] Sess. Cas. 4, 7-8 (Justiciary) (a Full Bench decision per L.J.-G. Inglis).
Since the Criminal Evidence Act, 1898, 61 & 62 Vict., c. 36, has made the accused a
competent, though not compellable witness, it was provided by statute in 1908 that a
suspect need no longer emit a declaration unless he so wished; and in practice suspects
have very rarely exercised the right to make a declaration at judicial examination.
Perhaps partly as a result of this development in modern practice and partly because of
the increased personal responsibility committed to Sheriffs-Substitute and ProcuratorsFiscal by the 1887 act, the Sheriff before committing an accused for trial has not in
general scrutinised the Crown precognitions. He has concentrated on the ProcuratorFiscal's petition for committal. Yet it has been competent for the Sheriff to peruse
the precognitions, and until very recently (July-August 1959) the pro forma warrant
for committal narrated that the Sheriff had considered this "Petition and the relevant
Precognitions." The reference to "precognitions" has been omitted from the new
pro forma warrants, thus bringing procedure into line with practice. On what
authority this revision has taken place is yet unknown to the writer. It is, however,
apparent that vestiges of a pre-trial judicial assessment of evidence survived until
quite recently in Scottish practice.
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holding of bail. Considerable weight must therefore be given to the
views of the Lord Advocate or his representatives. In practice the
system works well in a small country of five million inhabitants with a
strong professional tradition. The Scottish solution would not necessarily prove ideal in different conditions.
The history of bail in Scottish criminal law reaches back to very
early times. Persons accused even of the gravest capital offences might
be liberated upon providing security for their appearance to stand
trial.4 8 Prior to the Act of 1701, 4' however, bail was allowed or refused in all cases at the court's discretion, and there were no safeguards
against prolonged incarceration pending trial. Following upon the
Claim of Right, 1689,50 the Scottish Parliament in 1701 passed an "Act
for preventing wrongous Imprisonments and against undue delayes in
Tryals." This act, which is cumbrously expressed by modern standards, made a distinction between "bailable" and "non bailable" offences.
"Bailable offences" were such as could not be dealt with by capital
sentence. In respect of these the granting of bail was a right, and a
maximum tariff was fixed according to the social status of the accused.
The maximum amounts fixed by the act were twice increased during
the 18th century to bring them into closer accord with contemporary
economic circumstances.51 The Act of 1701 left undisturbed the existing discretion of the court to grant bail for "non bailable" crimes and
offences-scil., offences which could competently be punished by death
if the court so decided. These, of course, in the 18th century, comprised a wide range of criminal activity, including deforcement of revenue officers, thefts by habitual thieves, thefts by housebreaking of
anything-however small in value-and so forth. If bail was refused
in such cases, the accused was given a statutory right to speedy trial
or (in default thereof) to unconditional liberation.
Modern practice,"2 however, depends upon the Criminal Procedure
(Scotland) Act, 1887,11 and the Bail (Scotland) Act, 1888," 4 supplemented to some extent by the nobile officium of the High Court of
Justiciary-that is, the ultimate reserve of extraordinary or equitable
4

8 For history see II HumE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF SCOTLAND REsPEcrCRImES 87 (2d ed. 1819) ; INTRODUCTION TO ScoTTIsH LEGAL HISTORY 430 (Stair
Society Pub. 20, 1958).
49Act for preventing wrongous Imprisonments and against undue delayes in
Tryals, 1701, A.P.S., x, 272 c. 6.
50A.P.S., ix, 37.
51 Act of 1724, 11 Geo. 1, c. 26; Act of 1799, 39 Geo. 3, c. 49.
52
This Article is not concerned with bail pending the hearing of an appeal after

ING

conviction.

53 50 & 51 Vict., c. 35.
54 51 & 52 Vict, c. 36.
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jurisdiction inherent in the supreme criminal court. Now the granting
or refusal of bail is in all cases a matter of discretion.
In solemn procedure, an accused must normally appear before a
magistrate (usually the Sheriff) within forty-eight hours from the
time of his apprehension-in most cases on the morning after arrest.
At this stage, in modern practice the accused is not in fact examined
judicially, though he could competently elect to be. At these proceedings-which take place privately before the Sheriff in chambers, with
only the essential court and police officers and the accused and his law
agent present-the Procurator-Fiscal moves the court to commit the
accused either "until liberated in due course of law" or "for further
examination." This implies that the Sheriff may either forthwith commit the accused for trial, or he may defer making such an order while
further investigations are being made by the Crown authorities. In
considering Scottish practice regarding bail, it may be convenient, therefore, to deal first with procedure before the suspect is committed for
trial ("until liberated in due course of law") and thereafter to discuss
the granting of bail after commitment for trial.
Bail Before Final Commitment for Trial
The Children and Young Persons (Scotland) Act, 1937," 5 contains special provisions under which senior police officers are empowered to release on bail juveniles who have been arrested.5" Generally, however, the first opportunity to apply for bail occurs when a
person is brought before the Sheriff or a magistrate 5 7 -normally on
the morning after arrest-for judicial examination. At this stage he
is entitled to legal representation, and may immediately apply for liberation on his finding caution (security)." The Procurator-Fiscal is entitled to be heard against any such application,59 and at this stage
particular weight is given to his views. He will oppose release on bail
if this would interefere with -the enquiry, or if further charges are likely
to be preferred against the accused. He alone has had opportunity of
evaluating the evidence and the circumstances surrounding the case,
and, if, in the exercise of his discretion, he asks for a further period of
55 1 Edw. 8 & 1 Geo. 6, c. 37.
56 Sections 24(2), 40(1). Comparable powers are conferred in England by the
Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, c. 12, § 32. Section 32(1) (c) of
the English act has an interesting general proviso giving discretion to decline bail
when release might defeat the ends of justice.
57 Though in a general sense a Sheriff may exercise magisterial functions, the
term "magistrate," as used here, corresponds to municipal or police court judge in
the United States.
58 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vict., c. 35, § 18.

59 Ibid.
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up to eight days while further investigation is made, the court will not
readily refuse his request, even though the accused may be kept in
custody meanwhile. At this stage a statutory advantage is conferred
on the prosecutor's attitude to bail. The Bail (Scotland) Act, 1888,60
gives to the prosecutor alone a right of appeal against the sheriff's
decision to grant bail before commitment for trial; no statutory right
of appeal is given to the accused if bail is refused. He is, however,
not necessarily without remedy.
The standard work on Scottish criminal procedure 6 ' observes:
"The length of time which may intervene between commitment for
further examination and commitment for trial is not absolutely fixed,
but ought as a general rule not to exceed eight days. This must be
particularly observed in those cases where bail cannot be insisted upon
till after commitment until liberation in due course of law" (scil., trial) .62
Sheriffs, Procurators-Fiscal and Prison Governors are usually vigilant
to see this practice strictly observed, but in an exceptional case within
the writer's knowledge, a suspect was in fact held in custody for over
a month without being committed for trial at all. He had been advised
that he had no statutory right of appeal against the refusal of bail prior
to committal. In a case such as this, however, in the writer's opinion,
the High Court of Justiciary would have been prepared to exercise its
paramount and overriding authority preserved by the Bail (Scotland)
Act, 1888,63 to admit to bail any person charged with any crime or
offence. Otherwise the law of Scotland would have no safeguard
against indefinite incarceration. No other instance of detention for so
long a period before commitment for trial is known to the writer, but
the fact that it happened within the past three years perhaps suggests
that express provision by statute should be made limiting the lawful
period of detention "for further examination" without commitment for
trial. Meanwhile, though habeas corpus is not, of course, an institution recognized in Scottish practice, the Scottish superior courts 4 in
the exercise of their nobile officium are vigilant to vindicate the liberty
of the subject.
Bail After Commitment for Trial
If bail is refused before commitment for trial, the application may
be renewed after such commitment, and the Sheriff may then at his
discretion admit or refuse to admit the accused to bail. If he considers
60 51 & 52 Vict., c. 36, § 5.
61

62

63
64

RENTON

& BRowN, op. cit. supra note 7.

Id. at 43.
51 & 52 Vict, c. 36, § 5.
Le., the High Court of Justiciary and Court of Session.
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that the case is appropriate for bail, the Sheriff is expected to fix a sum
which the prisoner can find, but yet sufficient to deter him from absconding. The application for bail when the accused has been committed for trial may be opposed by the Procurator-Fiscal in the public
interest. Both prosecution and defence may appeal from the Sheriff's
decision to grant or refuse bail, and also if dissatisfied with the amount
fixed. Though a number of Scottish cases refer to the "presumption of
innocence," 65 bail is not in fact granted on the ground of that or any
other presumption. All accused persons-at least before trial-are
"presumed to be innocent." Much wider considerations of public interest and securing the ends of justice are applied. Of course, when an
accused applies for bail, he is entitled to have his application considered,
and to have bail granted unless good reasons are put forward for its
refusal; but the court's right of refusal is not confined to cases where,
if bail were granted, the accused might abscond: in exercising its discretion, broadly speaking, the court will have regard to the nature of
the crime alleged, the record of the accused and the attitude of the
Crown. Among the considerations to be borne in mind are the risk
that, if the accused were liberated on bail, he might intimidate witnesses
or tamper with evidence generally; or alone or in association with
others pursue criminal objects while on bail; or-as in cases of incest
or brutal domestic assault-resort to the type of conduct which is alleged against him by the prosecutor. The categories are not, however,
closed; and, since a general discretion is committed to the courts, they
are free to consider all relevant factors for or against the granting of
bail-as for example, that the accused has been subsisting for some
time without any known way of obtaining money-such as earnings,
private means, charity or public assistance.
The leading case, perhaps, is Mackintosh v. M'Glinchy,66 the decision of a Full Bench specially convened to determine whether the
discretion to grant or refuse bail was general, or restricted to considering the danger that an accused might abscond-as might have
been implied from the opinion of Lord Justice-General Dunedin in
Rennie v. Dickson17 The leading opinion of the Full Bench, delivered
by L. J-G. Clyde, asserted the discretion of the court to grant or refuse
bail in all cases-giving due weight to the views of the Lord Advocate
who has at his disposal means of obtaining information about a crime
and an accused. Lord Justice-General Clyde observed:
65
Young v. HMA, 1946 J.C. 5; HMA v. Quinn & Macdonald, 1921 J.C. 61;
Scott v. HMA, (1890) 2 White 570, [1890-18911 Sess. Cas. 15 (Justiciary).
66 1921 J.C. 75.
67 1907 5 Adams 372, [1906-19071 Sess. Cas. 111 (Justiciary).
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"[W]hen appeal is made to a discretionary power, the only safe
rule is that each case must be considered on its own merits, with
the sole view to the public interest and to securing the ends of
justice.

.

. . A good deal was said about the presumption of

innocence. I prefer not to treat the matter as a question of presumption. The accused person has the right to ask for bail; he
has the right to have his application considered; and, unless the
Court has before it some good reason why bail should not be
granted, bail ought to be allowed." 68
Apart from cases where there has been the danger of an accused
tampering with evidence or exposing complainers to peril, ProcuratorsFiscal since this decision have opposed bail on three main grounds:
first, where the accused has previously absconded when allowed bail,
or where there is evidence of the accused's intention to abscond;
secondly, where the accused has been liberated on bail, and is reported
to the Procurator-Fiscal for an offence alleged to have been committed
while at liberty which is either of a similar character to that originally
charged against him or is of a serious nature; and thirdly, where the
accused has a criminal record, is clearly (according to the prosecutor's
information) carrying on a career of crime and has been released from
prison shortly before the offence of which he is charged. Regarding
the validity of the third of these grounds there was some uncertaintycertain judges accepting it and others refusing to do so. Practice has,
however, become more uniform since the decision of the High Court
in Wright. 9 The accused in this case was charged with breaking into
premises, forcing a safe by explosives and stealing a substantial sum of
money. He had fifteen previous convictions.7" Bail had been granted
by the Sheriff in the sum of £150, and from this decision the Crown
appealed. The Lord Justice-General Clyde (son of the L.J-G. in
Mackintosh v. M'Glinchy) observed, with the approval of Lords Carmont and Russell:
"The considerations which are relevant to that matter must vary
from time to time with changing conditions. Today one material factor which ought always to be taken into account by
a court in determining whether or not to grant bail is the previous
record of the accused. This was recognized, and in my view properly recognized, by the Lord Justice-General in the case of MacDonald v. Clifford, 1952 J.C. 22. It is in my opinion contrary
to public interest that a man with a substantial criminal record
should be given the opportunity pending his trial of enlarging and
J.C. at 81-82.
Nov. 7, 1958 (unreported).
70
The previous convictions disclosed a clear pattern of serious criminal conduct
persisted in up to near the time of arrest.
68 1921
69
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extending his criminal activities. Experience has shown that all
too often that opportunity is taken if the opportunity is available.
A criminal record accordingly is an important factor against the
granting of bail. Indeed in some cases in itself it is sufficient to
warrant the court in refusing bail. That would be particularly so
where the list of previous convictions is substantial, and the latest
conviction is of relatively recent date. Such factors emphasize the
risk that the man may revert to his course of crime if released,
and it appears to me that the public interest in such circumstances
demands that that opportunity should not be given to him. In
this case in my view the record alone is ample to justify the course
which I recommend to your Lordships."
One factor which the judge (usually the Sheriff) considering bail
is not in a position to assess in Scotland is the strength of the case
against the accused. He is not conducting a pre-trial inquiry. The
conduct of such an inquiry is the function of the Procurator-Fiscal, as
directed by the Crown Office. The Lord Advocate and his representatives are concerned with the public interest, not only as prosecutors,
but also in assessing in the first instance whether bail should be granted
in any particular case. As prosecutors, moreover, it may be against
the prosecutors' interest to oppose bail. In a complicated case of fraud,
preparation of the case may well take longer than 110 days, and an
accused who has been detained in custody for 110 days from the date
of commitment is entitled to be set at liberty from prosecution.7 1
Though Scottish judges take into account a wider range of considerations than do English or American courts before awarding bail,
the Scottish attitude towards bail is liberal. Refusal of bail as a pre-,
cautionary punishment and as a form of economic discrimination may
be discounted. If it is thought that release of an accused on bail is
consistent with the public interest and the ends of justice, he will be
released, though his means are very limited. His financial position is
taken into account by the court-which may, however, in dubio also
consider whether he has a permanent address. Persons accused of
serious crimes have been released on quite small bail. If an appeal is
taken from the Sheriff to the High Court on the amount of bail fixed,
the tendency of the High Court is to show a liberal attitude and to
reduce this sum to what the accused can in fact raise. There are in
Scotland no professional granters of bail bonds. The accused, supported by his associates or relatives, finds the money, and the bail bond
usually runs in the name of the solicitor for the defence. This practice
sometimes results in dispute after trial as to whether the solicitor is
entitled to retain as part of his fee the sum lodged originally as bail.
71Criminal Procedure (Scotland)
RENTON & BROWN,

Act, 1887, 50 & 51 Vict., c. 35, §43.
op. cit. supra note 7, at 83-84.

See
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Such disputes are unlikely to arise when a reputable lawyer is concerned-but those who live according to the standards of a subculture
opposed to established law and order may find their legal advisers
among those who are not ignorant of the law of the jungle. In the
1930's there was some evidence that in Glasgow the associates of a
gang member in trouble might raise bail for him by intimidating shopkeepers and others to contribute. It does not appear that such unsavoury activity continues today.
There is no doubt that while an accused is in custody, preparation
of the defence is impeded-especially if he wishes to trace witnesses of
a type which would be unlikely to get in touch with a lawyer or other
law abiding citizen. If the public interest will not permit bail, in Scotland all reasonable facilities are given to the prisoner and his advisers.
According to Scottish practice the defence must be given ample notice
before trial regarding productions 72 and regarding the prosecution's
witnesses. If these latter are reluctant to give their account to the
defence on precognition,7 the Crown will assist the defence by showing
them the Crown precognitions. In cases of murder, the Crown as a
matter of established practice and courtesy invariably give copies of the
prosecution's precognitions to the defence.
In Scotland there has been no complaint as to delay in the hearing of bail applications and appeals. An application must be dealt with
within twenty-four hours of its presentation to a competent magistrate.74
So far as appeals are concerned, written notice is given by the party
appealing as soon as the Sheriff has reached his decision on the application. If an appeal is taken by the prosecutor objecting to the granting of bail, the accused (if he has found bail as required) must nevertheless-unless the appeal has succeeded-be liberated after seventy-two
hours (or in the Outer Hebrides, Orkneys or Shetlands ninety-six
hours) after the application for bail was granted. This right to liberation is effective whether the appeal has been heard or not, unless the
High Court orders the accused to be detained in custody pending consideration of the appeal.75
To summarise in conclusion the main contrasts between bail practice in Scotland, the United States, and England the writer would stress
the following points. In the United States and in England the claim
to bail or speedy trial is supported by habeas corpus, a procedure un72

Anglice, "exhibits."

Productions include all documents and articles of what-

soever sort intended to be produced in evidence.
73

Precognitions in this context means the written record of a statement given by

a witness to the Procurator-Fiscal as to the evidence which such witness can give
trial.
at the
7
4 Bail (Scotland) Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict, c. 36, § 2.
75 Bail (Scotland) Act, 1888, 51 & 52 Vict, c. 36, § 7.
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known to modem Scots law, which has its own methods of securing
the liberty of the subject. In America in theory, and in England, subject to one qualification, the courts direct their minds only to the question whether suspect, if bailed, will abscond; and, if the court is
satisfied that he will not, they admit him to bail. In Scots law bail is
a privilege, granted at discretion, after general review of the public
interest. In England and America, before an accused is committed for
trial, the evidence against him is led at a pre-trial hearing, so that the
court which grants or refuses bail takes into account the strength of the
prosecution's case. In Scotland, there is no pre-trial hearing; 76 those
who act in the public interest are most fully informed regarding the alleged crime and the antecedents of the accused, and they have the responsibility in the first place of agreeing to or opposing his application
for bail. Much weight is given to their opinion. Their attitude is quite
independent of the police. The Crown Office and the Lord Advocate's
representatives exercise their discretion and responsibilities in accordance with a long-established, generous and humane tradition-which
influences bail practice and criminal procedure in general. One can
claim no more than that it works very well in a small country with a
strict professional etiquette. On the presumption of innocence, American
and English judges have ostensibly founded the right to bail; but, if
this were really the kernel of the matter, all suspects would be bailed.
As it is, in American practice it would seem that the presumption is
sometimes invoked to let loose on the public, pending trial, a number
of wealthy suspects who, whatever the presumption in their favour, do
not act while on bail like innocent men. Scots law has now discarded
the "presumption of innocence" theory in favour of a general discretion
for a court to grant bail in all cases unless satisfied that this would be
contrary to the public interest and the ends of justice. This solution,
it is suggested, has much to commend it, though the writer considers
that the conditions of persons held in custody before trial in Scotland
could be greatly improved. Deprivation of liberty is a sufficient sacrifice to the public interest; discomfort or indignity, however, cannot be
altogether avoided in the institutions where at present prisoners are
confined in Scotland pending trial.
76This Article does not discuss the problem of bail in summary procedure according to Scottish practice; on this see RENTo & BROWN, op. cit. supra note 7, at 232.
The fundamental principles are the same, but as there is no preliminary petition for
committal as in solemn procedure, the question of bail does not usually arise until
the accused is before the court. Accordingly, by statute senior police officers are
empowered to release on bail persons accused of minor offences pending their appearance in court. See also Kennedy v. Heatly, 1951 J.C. 118.

